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

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DEVOTED TO RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, MYSTICISM & SCIENCE OF YOGA

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

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PATHWAY TO GOD

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No. 3
April-June 1996

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Editior :
Shri P. D. Dharwarkar
B.Sc., C.Eng. F.I.E., M.A.S.C.E.
Phone 30701

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Articles on Comparative study of Religion, Spiritual Life, Mysticism, Science of Yoga and other relevant subjects are solicited. They should be typed with Double spacing and on one side of the page.

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Contents :

Prayer 3

Editorial 4

Precept & Practice 8
- *P. D. Dharwarkar*

Perceptual Knowledge :
- *Dr. R. I. Ingalalli* 9

Be Benevolent, selfless and live a longer, Purposeful life
- *P. D. Dharwarkar* 26

Śri Śaṅkarācārya's Atmanātmanā-Viveka (Contd.)
- *Prof. Dr. K. V. Apte* 29

Śruti-Sarā-Samuddharaṇā of Toṭakacārya - (Contd.)
- *Dr. M. G. Hampiholi* 42

My Reminiscences of Shri Gurudeva, (Contd.)
- *Prof. M. L. Sharma* 51

Book-Reviews 55
Quarterly Report 63

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Editor :
Shri P. D. Dharwarkar
B.Sc., C.Eng. F.I.E., M.A.S.C.E.
Phone 30701

Prayer

To the Lord of the Universe

उपहरणं विभवानां संहरणं सकलदुरित जालस्य ।
उद्धरणं संसाराच्चरणं वः श्रेयसेऽस्तु विश्वपतेः ।।

We Pray to the Lord of the Universe, who is the bestower of all prosperity, who is the destroyer of the tangled mass of sins, who delivers us from the bonds of worldly Life, for welfare to all through His (lotus) feet.

दिक्कालाद्यनवच्छिन्नानंत चिन्मात्रमूर्तये ।
स्वानुभूत्येकसाराय नमः शान्ताय तेजसे ।।

I offer salutations to the Lord of the Universe who cannot be limited by space & time, who is without end (and without beginning), who embodies the active principle of life, who is the cool brilliance as the essence of the experience of the Self.

जपो जल्पः शिल्पं सकलमपि मुद्राविरचना !
गतिः प्रादक्षिण्यक्रमणमदनान्याहुति विधिः ।
प्रणामः संवेशः सकलमिदमात्मार्पण विधौ
सपर्यापर्याय स्तव भवतु यन्मे विलसितम् ।।

Whatever I talk may transpire into your Nama-Japa,
Whatever I work may convert into your manifestation,
Whenever I walk, it may become circumambulation about you,
Whatever I eat may become offering of Ahuti to you,
Whenever I sleep it may become prostration to you,
Whenever I adorn myself (with Rudraksha Mala etc.)
it may convert into worship of yourself,
Likewise, I offer all that is myself to you by the Atma-Samarpan Vidhi.

नमो विश्वसृजे पूर्वं विश्वं तदनुविभ्रते ।
अथ विश्वस्य संहर्त्रे तुभ्यं त्रेधास्थितात्मने ।।

You create the Universe first; then nourish the same; and ultimately destroy it. I offer salutations to thee in all your three manifestations.

❑❑

EDITORIAL

Atmānam Viddhi

(Know Thyself)

The greatest research ever carried out any where in the world was done by the ancient sages in India, on how to attain Godhood through development of one's own mental facilities, hitherto unknown to mankind. Not only did they discover the Science of Yoga, but also found the process by which one's individual mind can get attached to the Universal mind, which they called "Mahat". Once this is achieved, the secrets of the universe get revealed. Discoveries of modern science pale into insignificance before this scientific effort of the sages, carried out with a researcher's zeal. They analysed the individual mind, discovered its unknown faculties and found out the path-way to God Realisation.

It is the mind that is responsible for all the activities of the individual. It is the mind that directs the brain to put the body into action through the nervous system. It is the mind that goads a man to become a learned person, a devotee of God, a social worker, an evil doer or a reck-less ruffian. Sage Vasishtha says "The doer and enjoyer of all the hap-piness, unhappiness & fanciful ideas, is the mind & the mind alone. Therefore recognise that the mind is the essence of man, nay, the man himself". Thus it is essential to know one's mind to know oneself.

The power of the mind is limitless. Why not channelise this power of the mind in the right direction? This thought deeply engrossed the attention of the sages. The mind is the driver of the body vehicle & to utilise its power one should be in a position to control & direct the mind itself. To get this directional control of the mind, one has to divest the mind of its usual worldly desires, ambitions & ego and make it learn to remain still and concentrate, to develop its power. In Bhagawadgeeta, Shrikrishna Says "मन्मना भव । मद्याजी भव । *Meaning thereby that one should divest one's mind of all other thoughts and concentrate on Him alone.*

The great saint of Maharashtra, Samarth Ramdas Swami directly advises the mind in his "Mana che Sloka" (Advice to the mind) stressing the importance of the mind in human existence. He says मना सज्ञना भक्तिपंथेचि जावे। तरी तो श्रीहरी पाविजे तो स्वभावे । जनीं निंद्य तें सर्व सोडोनि द्यावे । जनी वंद्य तें सर्वभावे करावे।। *meaning thereby that one should follow the path of devotion, which is the easiest way to attain Him as it is in his very nature to reach His devotee. At the same time, he exhorts the mind to forsake all evil deeds and dedicate oneself to good deeds.* मना वासना चूकवी येरझारा । मना कामना सांडी रे द्रव्यदारा ।। *meaning that the mind should give up all desires which is the cause of births & rebirths. The mind should give away the temptations of wealth & women. The saint thus advises the mind to divest itself of all worldly desires in order to concentrate itself on Him & Him alone. That is the way to develop the limitless power of the mind.*

He further says that विवेकें देहबुद्धि सोडुनि द्यावी । विदेही पणें मुक्ती भोगीत जावी ।। *Here, the saint indicates a stage of mind higher than the stillness and single point concentration. He asks the mind to use its power of discrimination & withdraw from the gross body to enjoy the state of being "without the gross body". This is a state akin to death but without actually dying. In this state, the mind takes away the consciousness from the gross body & enters the subtle body. What is this subtle body* (सूक्ष्मदेह)*? It is the body of ethereal material created by the mind itself to express its own personality. Some people, therefore, prefer to call it* (मनोदेह) *the mental body. In this state, the mind enjoys many Supernatural powers like telepathy, television, clairvoyance and others. The eyes do not need the light of the sun to see, the sight can pierce through obstacles, nor the ears need the air-activated drums to hear. That is why Samarth Ramdas Swami asks the mind to withdraw from the gross body & enjoy the state of the ethereal body. When the mind goes into the ethereal body, the mind supplies the minimum energy to the gross body to keep it alive. The mind may remain in such a state for a few seconds, a few minutes or more according to the ability of the person, who has obtained the directive control over the mind.*

The great clairvoyant person, Madame Blavatsky, the founder of the Theosophical Society, also said that the Universe, beyond the gross universe, is vast and one should strive to see it.

How the mind attains these Supernatural powers? When it withdraws from the gross body, it gets attached to the Uni-

versal Mind and derives the super powers from it. When an individual mind gets attached to the Universal Mind, the man is overwhelmed with amazement and is unable to know what has happened. The overwhelming experience is described by a saint as " मुंगी उडाली आकाशी" (The ant has flown to the skies) An invisible spark from the individual flies out and goes high up in the sky, so high, that the man is unable to see it. It happens to a man whose mind is divested of all worldly thoughts and has a firm base in the Yama (यम) & Niyama (नियम) as enunciated by sage Patanjali. It is a recognition of the highly developed soul, by the Almighty. He is a person specially blessed by the Almighty. Once this happens, Sri Krishna's promise in Bhagwadgeeta " योगक्षेमं वहाम्यहम् " (I lookafter the well being) comes true for such a person. He becomes fearless & does whatever duty is assigned by the Almighty through Himself, through a Deity, a Benevolent Soul or through his own Guru. About such a person, Samarth Ramdas Swami says " समर्थाचिया सेवका वक्र पाहे । असा भूमंडळी कोण आहे । Nobody, in the whole of the universe, can afford to be enemical to such a person (because he is now under the powerful protection of the Almighty Himself)

All this is possible, through human effort & determination. The Guru initiates a disciple or an aspirant into the spiritual path, by giving 'Mantra-japa' or something else. But shaking out the dross of desires and imbibing the essential virtues, is to be done by the aspirant or disciple through his own initiative & effort and cannot be done, by Guru Krupa alone. ❑❑

Precept & Practice

If a man has to progress on the pathway to God Realisation, he has to imbibe the basic virtues enunciated by the sages & saints as essential for a seeker and practise them. One may read the scriptures, sing devotional songs, attend discourses, but if he is unable to follow the virtues in his behavior, it is a case of "nearer the church but farther from God".

Samarth Ramdas Swami, the great saint of Maharashtra, composed the ''मनाचे श्लोक'' (Advice to the Mind) which gives not only the virtues one has to imbibe for spiritual progress, but also prescribes on how to judge the various types of persons one comes across in life and the behavioural pattern one has to adopt in different situations in worldly life. He prescribed a strong build for one's body such that if one comes across a bully, one should be able to deal with him as a bigger bully. He also said that, "One's mind should always be alert " such that one is able to grasp a situation or sense a danger immediately.

Ramdas Swami used to go on tour from place to place meeting people and asking youth to worship Lord Hanuman and be strong to face any situation during the Muslim rule in India. On one such preaching tours, he halted at a place for a night's rest along with his disciple Kalyanswami. At midnight, he sensed that a group of people, about 8 or 10 in number, probably thieves, have gathered outside in the dark with evil intentions.

Kalyanswami, a youth of strong gymnastic build, asked his Guru, what he should do. Ramdas Swami said "evildoers must be punished. Recall the prowess of Maharudra and go out to punish them." Kalyanswami asked whether he should kill them. Ramdas Swami told him that killing under such a situation is against the tenet of non-violence, but they should be punished adequately. Kalyanswami went out, fought with them bare-handed and beat them severely. All were seriously injured and started screaming with pain. Kalyanswami lifted them one by one, threw them in the jungle nearby, came back to the resting place & slept.

Early morning, when Ramdas Swami went out in the jungle for call of nature, he heard cries of pain. He went near and enquired. He was told by them that they were reduced to that state by his disciple. Ramdas Swami called Kalyan and asked him to carry them to the resting place and arrange for some medicines. At the same time make them take a vow that they will not indulge again in stealing or other evil acts.

If precept & practice do not go together, it amounts to pretence and life becomes meaningless. A person who preaches tenets, which he himself does not follow in his life, is called by Ramdas Swami a learned fool (पढत मूर्ख).

P. D. DHARWARKAR



Born :
JAMKHANDI
3-7-1886

Samadhi :
NIMBAL
6-6-1957

Perceptual Knowledge

(Pratyakṣa-Pramā)

-its non-linguistic and linguistic components.

1. In Indian intellectual tradition the concept of perception plays a cardinal role, because perception as an important source of knowledge (pramāṇa) is the special instrumental cause of perceptual knowledge (Pratyakṣa-pramā) and it provides an exact understanding about the reality. The aim of this paper is to consider critically different views on perception in Indian tradition in order to reconstruct Indian theory of perceptual knowledge in terms of contemporary epistemological concepts. In the sequel I would like to analyse the meaning and definitions of perceptual knowledge. After discussing certain non-linguistic components of perceptual knowledge, linguistic components are also analysed. And then follows comparative understanding of perceptual knowledge in Indian and Western contexts in which similarities and and differences are considered.

2. The Sanskrit word "pratyakṣa" is normally rendered as perception. Etymologically the word 'pratyaksa' consists of two elements namely prati (near, before) and akṣa (sense-organ); consequently it means "present to the eyes or any sense organ" hence direct or immediate in contrast with parokṣa which means "away from any sense organ" as mediate or indirect. The word pratyakṣa has been used differently. It is used as a noun and also as an adjective : as a noun it stands for immediate knowledge (pratyakṣa-pramā) i.e. perceptual knowledge and/or for the source of perceptual knowledge (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa). However as an adjective it is applied to knowledge (pramā) - pratyaksa-pramā and perceptual error (pratyakṣābhāṣa). It also qualifies the source of perceptual knowledge as pratyakṣa pramaṇa.

In the present context 'pratyaksa' is treated as perceptual knowledge even though the word 'Pratyakṣa' ambiguously used to designate both pratyaksa-pramā, i. e. perceptual knowledge and its source namely pratyaksa-pramāna. Pratyaksa Pramāna is the source (or instrumental cause of pratyaksa prama (pratyakṣa - pramā karnam pratyaksa-pramānam). The instrumental cause of perceptual knowledge is perception. Normally perception involves sensation and judgment; and consequently it is expressed in perceptual sentence."

3. Pratyaksa-pramā as perceptual knowledge arises on account of sensory experience of objects given in the world. Since knowledge is justified true belief; perceptual knowledge also consists of truth, belief and justification as its components: Schematically a knowing subject (s) (pramatra) knows that *p* (where *p* is any true perceptual judgment) if and only if s believes that *p*, *p* is true and s is justified in believing that *p*. Elsewhere I have argued that perceptual justification is direct or mediate; it is unlike non-perceptual justification which is immediate. For instance in case of valid inferential judgment the conclusion is justified by means of its premises. In case of perceptual situation objects are given for perception. Whenever an object like pot (ghata) is adequately perceived by a subject, the knowledge of pot is expressed as follows :

'S'abda-pramāna-An Epistemological Analysis : Indian Books Centre, Delhi (1988) PP. 14-15, 22-23.

S knows that 'the pot is on the ground' if and only if

(i) It is a fact that 'the pot is on the ground' or the proposition 'the pot is on the ground' is true.

(ii) *S* believes that 'the pot is on the gound' and

(iii) *S* is justified to believe in 'the pot is on the ground' by means of his direct sense-experience.

In the above analysis (i) is the truth condition of perceptual knowledge which is an objective condition and is independent of any percepient i. e. knowing subject. That is to say that a given fact like 'a certain pot is kept on the ground' is true independent of any observer. There are many

such facts and such facts are called perceptual facts because they are capable of being perceived by human beings. The fact that 'Gaurishankar is the tallest mountain in the World' was also true before its discovery. And possibly there are facts to be discovered in future by means of careful observation (perception). (ii) If perceptual facts are adequately apprehended by means of sense-perception under normal condition, the observer entertains his belief through his perceptual awareness of an object. However in case of perceptual error, a person may withdraw his belief regarding what is not a case which implies falsehood. Perceptual belief implies a certain state of mind that a knowing subject possesses in order to claim that he knows something perceptually. It is a deterministic state of mind in which there is no chance for entertaining any counter belief or doubt. That is to say that he firmly believes in his perceptual awareness of a given object.

4. Further his perceptual belief is to be grounded in direct experience of a given object. And direct sense-experience provides immediate or non-propositional justification for his belief in a perceptual judgment say, 'that pot is on the ground'. That is to say that pratyakṣa-pramāṇa-sensory observation like seeing or hearing provides adequate justification for perceptual knowledge (pratyaksa-pramā). Normally pratyakṣa-pramā as perceptual knowledge is non-linguistic because it is prior to any linguistic expression but it is capable of being expressed through true sentences. For clearer understanding of the nature of perceptual knowledge it is necessary to examine different difinitions of perception given by different systems. Different definitions are to be sorted out according to the meta-physical presuppositions of the systems. I would like to classify various definitions of perceptions into (a) realistic, (b) idealistic and (c) linguistic definitions. Realistic definitions have been formulated by Nyāya-Vaiśesika, Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Pūrva-mīmamsā and some branches of Advaita-Vedānta and Sautrāntic and Vaibhāśika Buddhists. Idealistic formulations are normally found in Vijñānavadi idealists. However linguistic formulation is given by Bhrtṛa-hari and others.

5. Following are some of the definitions of perception - i.e. perceptual knowledge.

(a) Realistic definitions :

D1 : Perceptual knowledge is that knowledge which arises from contact of sense-organ with its object: it is independent of verbal expression, non-erroneous and is definite" (Indriyārthsamnikarsot-pannam Jñanam avyapadeṣyam avyabhicāri Vyavasāyatmakam pratyakṣam. *Nyāya-Sutra* (1.144).

D2 : Perceptual knowledge is characterised by immediacy of apprehension and is not brought out by the instrumentality of any antecendent knowledge (Pratyaksasya-Saksatkaritvam lakṣaṇam Jñana-karaṇakam Jñānamiti tu vayam : *Tattva-Cintāmani* Pratyakṣa-Khaṇda (p. 543).

D3 : Perceptual knowledge is that knowledge which is caused by the contact of the sense-organ with its object (indriyartha Saṇṇikarṣajanyaṃ Jñānam Pratyakṣam; *Tarka-Samgrah* : 42).

D4 : Perceptual is caused by sense - object contact and is not caused by any antecedent knowledge. (Indriya janyam jnanam pratyaksam; jnanakaranakam jnanam pratyaksam : *Nyaya Siddhanta - muktavali* : 52).

D5 : "Perceptual knowledge is awareness of external objects". *Brahma Sutra-Bhasya* of Sankaracharya : 2-2-28.

D6 : Perceptual knowledge as the apprehension of the unique particular object (Svalaksana) is given directly through the senses. *Nyaya-bindu* : pp. 11-16.

D7 : Perceptual knowledge as perceptual awareness is invariably associated with words, (cited in *Nyāya mañjari* : pp. 170; the view of Bhartra-hari) (Linguistic definition).

D8 : Perceptual knowledge is in the form of awareness of mental ideas : (Vijñāna-vāda-Buddhism) (Idealistic definition).

As shown above there is a marked divergence of views among different systems. Leaving aside the minute internal differences authors like Datta (1972:35) prefer to classify

broadly the different views into three types. Majority of views consider perceptual knowledge arising out of sense-object contact. Vedantins, Prabhakaras and neo-Naiyãyikas characterise perception as immediate knowledge. However Buddists treat perception as a non-erroneous true cognition of the unique particular. Even though the more popular and general view of perception is in accordance with D1 given by Gautama, it is necessary to analyse the components of the difinition D1 with reference to the criticisms of other views on perception.

6. Analysis of non-linguistic - components contained in the definition D1 :- The important components are avyapadesyam (non-verbal), avyabhicāri (non-erroneous) and vyavasāyātmakam (definite or determinate). Main implication of D1 is that perceptual knowledge in the form of true perceptual judgment is prior to linguistic expression. that is to say that a perceptual judgment or proposition as a non-linguistic logical element is capable of being expressed in a sentence. Accordingly a true perceptual sentence expresses a true perceptual judgment. Traditionally various meanings of the word 'avyapadesya' have been considered. The contrary expression 'vyapadesya' means perceptual knowledge expressed in the words; consequently such perceptual knowledge could be communicated. However in order to exclude verbal interpretation of sense-experience from perception the word avyapadesyam (not mixed with words) is used.

There is another sense of the term 'avyapadesa' that it has been used by the author of the Nyaya-sutra that perceptual knowledge is not derived from any other verbal source. A piece of knowledge is perceptual if it is invariably associated with the sense-organ and its causal connection is determined by the application of the joint method of agreement and disagrement. Thus 'this piece of knowledge is perceptual if it is vivid, that it is word-independent at the time of its appearance, is causally connected with the sense-organ'. Eventhough in some cases, the recollection of the name of an object to be perceived is one of the necessary

conditions of determinate perception yet it is not derived only from knowledge of the word, because sense-organ plays the important role of a cause of perceptual knowledge, however recollection of the name plays a subordinate role in the perception. Thus it is clear that perceptual cognition is independent perceptual sentences; however perceptual sentences express cognitions in the perceptual situations.

Another important notion in the definition (D1) of perception is truth element as a necessary condition. This condition is a non-erroneous nature of a perceptual cognition. Eventhough sense object contact is common to true and non-erroneous cognitions it is necessary to specify the nature of Veridical perception, so that the definition (D1) is strictly applicable to correct perceptions only. Consequently D1 is consistant with the definition of pramana as the source of knowledge only. In order to distinguish perceptual knowledge from perceptual error, erroneous perception or perceptual illusions are explained. In a given perceptual context there is a need to sort out perceptual knowledge from perceptual error. Perceptual knowledge as a species of knowledge consists of truth such that it is structured in the relation of correspondence between perceptual judgment and its fact. Accordingly a perceptual judgment (p) is true if and only if it corresponds to (perceptual) fact. That is to say that :

A perceptual judgment (p) is true = df. p corresponds to reality or fact (f), otherwise it is false. And a perceptual judgment (p') is false = df, p' does not correspond to fact (f). Perceptual knowledge provides a criterion of demarcation so that perceptual knowledge is unique. And at the same time perceptual knowledge exhibits formal and material adequacy conditions. Satisfaction of the formal criterion implies the fulfilment of formal consistency judgments. Mutual consistency of perceptual judgments has two aspects: (namely) consistency of true perceptual judgment derived from the same perceptual mechanism, for example, *seeing*. By means of visual perception it is possible to assess the consistency of all true visual perceptions. And any visual perceptual judgment would be considered to be false if it conflicts with

or set of true perceptual judgments. Similarly a true visual perceptual judgment ought to be consistent with other true perceptual judgments derived from hearing, smelling, tasting etc. Since perceptual knowledge is immediate and direct, it also functions as a criterion for mediate knowledge. Mediate perceptual knowledge is normally based on direct knowledge of particular facts derived from perception. Because perception of individual facts yields basic knowledge of particular facts and by means of basic knowledge of general facts if formulated.

Another important defining characteristic of perceptual knowledge according to (D1) is the concept of *vyavasāyātmakam* (definiteness). The notion of definiteness as a logical virtue eliminates indefinite or doubtful cognition having a structure 'a is x or y' where x and y stand for different properties. Accordingly indefinite or doubtful-cognition shows an unstable state of mind. However in case of definite cognitions something is definitely predicted to certain subject. In that case both true and false cognitions are covered because in either case there is an element of definite-ness. But that does not mean that the definition (D1) is applicable to false cognition, because as per the definition the definite cognition must be true also. It is to be noted that the second condition of truth implies definite-ness also. In a perceptual situation it is necessary to be explicit about the definite characteristic of a true cognition in order to have perceptual knowledge. An adequate appreciation of an object through the relation of sense-object contact is guarantee for definite-ness of a true cognition. In case of perceptual knowledge we have to distinguish perceptual judgment and sensation. Even though sensation is common to right perception and wrong perception, the difference is due to mode of judging i. e. difference is due to logical construction of sensation. Traditionally texts like Nyaya-bhasya, analyse the difference between veridical and non-veridical perception based on sensation. And on Nyaya view only true perceptual judgment constitutes the essence of perceptual knowledge. That is to say that perceptual knowledge implies truth as a necessary condition.

Analysis of Buddhist's definition : However authors like Dharmakīrti have-defined perception (or sensation) as a form of consciousness which is free from determination by imagination (i.e. it is not the product of synthetic imagination and is non-erroneous). On this view constructed knowledge of objects is capable of being expressed in words. However the view is not acceptable to Naiyāyikas.

Traditionally as said above, the concept of true cognition (Yathārtha jñana) is understood in terms of the relation of correspondence between a cognition and its fact. That is to say that a cognition is true if it describes its fact adequately. However in case of incorrect cognition something is perceived as something else. It is to be noted that whenever a false cognition arises on account of misapprehension of a fact, a person may not think that he wrongly perceived something as something else. Only he could later discover his misapprehension by means of doubting his false cognition and consequently he discovers his own erroneous cognition in order to have right understanding of a perceptual fact.

It is somewhat interesting to note that Buddhist view of perception of individuals devoid of any conceptualisation seems to be closer to Western idea of sensation which is pre-judgmental sense-experience. It is customary to understand human perception interms of sensation and interpretation of that sensation. Sensation is basically physiological process that takes place in an individual. Intensity of sensation varies from individual to individual and for a given individual, sensation of an a particular object is a function of clarity of consciousness. Soon after the state of meditation things are clearly perceived i. e. to say that quiettal mind has more potentiality for clearer sensation. But sensation in itself may not be considered as an instance of genuine perception even though it is a pre-requisite of all empirical perception. Because sensation as uninterpreted form of experience is neutral to truth value - it is neither true nor false; but at judgmental level interpretation of that sensory experience is either true or false, Some modern empiricists have interpreted sensation itself as genuine form of knowledge technically

called basic knowledge. On this view all human sensation is right in itself and it is wrong to say that there are defective sensations even though there are false perceptions. And on this view there is a distinction between the language of sensation and language of perception. The language of perception is relatively objective and hence inter-subjectively used; whereas language of sensation is subjective and is not given for intersubjective assessment. However there are differences between Buddhist theory of sensation and Western theory of sensation or sense-data. On Buddhist view the so-called pure sensation is completely subjective experience for a given individual. Any conceptual or linguistic imposition on that sensation would invalidate the basic mechanism involved in experience of the given particular in the field of silent consciousness in which sensation as a passive sensory experience takes place. And to certain extent Buddhist view of bare sensation is similar to Nyaya-vaisesika view of nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as a necessary prior condition for determinate perception, sensation may be considered as a unique sensory experience. Before learning any form of language and thinking individuals are given natural powers of sensation. Whenever an individual develops his linguistic habits along with thinking, there is a possibility of describing a given experience. Buddhists deny any kind of interpretation of sensation. However modern empiricists utilise subjective language to describe sense-experience and such sentences are called basic sentences, protocol sentences which are immune to falsification and they form the foundation of scientific knowledge.

However it need not be the case that any statement about direct experience is always infallible. Some modern empiriticists (consider the possibility of erroneous sense-data sentences as a basic sentence. And consequently there is a need to develop criterion of adequacy for sense-data-sentences. In Buddhist theory perception the pragmatic criterion is available to test a given sensation as right or wrong. Accordingly a given sense-perception is true if it gives rise to fruitful activity. At best Buddhist theory provides a fragmentary understanding of perception especially

inditerminate aspect as sensation. However it is incomplete, for it does not consider an important aspect of perception which involves rationalisation of a sense-experience. Thus theory of sensation is only one of the necessary elements in the complete theory of perception. Similarly the linguistic definition (D7) and idealistic definitions (D8) are also incomplete for the following reasons. Even though the defining property of the linguistic definition of perceptual knowledge is in the form of invariable relationship between sensation and verbal usage about that sensation, quite often distinction is drawn. The spirit (D7) is that sensation which is the nucleus of perception is linguistic, because from a metaphysical point of view ultimate reality is characterised by linguistic principles. However from empirical point of view for all practical purposes it is indispensable to maintain the distinction between word and object, so that the description is different from the described. At best (D7) is considered to be a definition of perception at the level of expression or communication. Next idealist's definition (D8) is also incomplete, because it considers only subjective aspective perception i. e. mental perception according to which ideas alone are real. However the reality of ideas ought to be questioned in the absence their objective counter-parts. Since in the actual world of experience we ought to maintain the distinction between word, idea and object the idealistic theory provides only fragmentary view of perception.

Further for clearer understanding of D1 it is necessary to consider the views of Navya-nyāya on the concept of perception. In the Navya-Nyaya system of Gangesvara (1300 AD) pratyaksa-pramā (Perceptual knowledge) is formulated in relation to Pratyakṣa Pramaṇā (Perception) such that pratyakṣa pramāṇa is the instrumental cause of pratyakṣa-pramā (perceptual knowledge).

Gangśa critically considers several definitions of pratyaksa-prama in order to formulate more adequate definition.

The old school of Nyāya formulates the definitions of perceptual knowledge in terms of sense-object contact. According to it (D1) perceptual knowledge (pramā) is true cognition (knowledge) produced by the contact of an object with a sense organ, (indriyārtha sannikarsotpannam jñānamavyabhicāri).

This definition implies that perceptual knowledge is a form of true cognition which is conditioned by the stimulation of senses as influenced by their objects. The definition follows from the etymology of the word 'pratyakṣa' which derivatively means the functioning of the sense organs, in relation to its particular object (aksasya prativiṣayaṃ vṛttih pratyakṣam). Whenever a sense-organ adequately functions in relation to its object, the result is a true cognition of that object.

The exponent of the modern school of Nyāya, Gangeśa offers criticisms to D1. Firstly, D1 is too wide, for it applies to inference and memory, as forms of knowledge they involve sense object contact. Mind as an internal sense organ functions toward the object known through inference or memory. Secondly, the definition D1 is also too narrow in another sense, for it excludes divine perception which is a direct perception of all the facts. Further there can be species of perception without sense-object contact.

Consequently sense-object contact is not common to all perceptions. Further definition of perception in terms of sense stimulation begs the question; the nature of sense-stimulations to be known from the characteristic of perception and we understand what perception is through the meaning of sense-object contact.

However in the (syncretist) school of Nyāya attempts have been made to defend the older definition of perceptual knowledge (D1). Authors like Udayana, have suggested that the definition of perception given in the Nyāya sūtra in terms of sense-object contact applies only, to human perception. Since pramāna śāstra is concerned with the criteria or

grounds of knowledge, it is not primarily concerned with the eternal and unconditioned knowledge of the divine being. However in order to accommondate extra-ordinary (alaukika) perception as well as the divine perception it is necessary to widen the scope of the definition (D1).

Another definition (D2) without reference to sense-object contact is considered and shown to be inadequate D2: 'Perceptual knowledge is that true apprehension produced by sense organ' implies the functions of sense-organ as the characteristic of perceptual knowledge. But this definition is too wide. It is applicable to other forms of prama including memory knowledge, for mind as a sense-organ functions in every form of prama.

Although still another definition (D) of pratyaksa as direct apprehension; formulated by Prābhākaras, does not contain sense object contact as defining property, it is also considered to be inadequate for the following reasons. Perceptual cognition characterised as immediate cognition includes even memory, inference etc. which are considered to be perceptual in the subjective side in relation to the knower (svāṃse jñātraṃśeca). Eventhough perceptual knowledge is understood as immediate knowledge, immediacy (saksātva) in the form universal (jāti) is not recognised by Prābhākaras. However every cognition is not reduciable to perceptual knowledge.

In view of such defects in the above definitions Gaṅgeśa formulates the definition of perception as immediate knowledge. And character of immediacy (sākṣātkāritvam) is common to different forms of perceptions. The simpler formulation of the definition of pratyaksa is as follows :

D : Perceptual knowledge is characterised by immediacy of apprehension.

(Pratyakṣasya sākṣātkāritvam lakṣaṇam)

In this definition immediacy or saksatkaritvam is universal (jāti) sākṣātkaromi (apprehend directly) as anuvyavsāya (after cognition) in perceptual knowledge implies general characteristic of sākṣātkāritvam (immediacy). Another definition of perceptual knowledge given by Gaṅgeśa is as follows :

(d) : Perceptual knowledge is not brought about by the instrumentality of any antecedent knowledge. (jñānakaraṇakam Jñānamiti tu vayam).

This definition (d) is the negative characterisation of perceptual knowledge which is not derived through the function of any others antecedent knowledge. However the two definitions (D) and (d) stated above are not mutually exclusive. The definition (D) logically implies the definition (d) because the nature of immediacy of perceptual knowledge, must be understood in terms of being directly evident and directly evident as the property of cognition does not presuppose another cognition.

However the usage of the word jñana in the definition (d) seems to be ambiguous, for jñana is either yathārtha-jñana (true cognition) or ayatharthajñaja (false cognition). Consequently the definitions (d) and (D) are occasionaly applicable to perceptions such as illusion, hallucination dream and the like. There is an element of immediacy or direct awareness without any presupposition of prior cognition.

But this objection is not correct. Contextually the definitions (D) and (d) are formulated to characterise pratyaksapramā (perceptual knowledge) only. because pratyakṣa-pramā is caused by pratyakṣa pramāna. And pratyakṣa-pramā as a species of pramā is to be understood as a true cognition which corresponds to its fact. It may be asked if a defining property of pramā (knowledge) in general is tadvatita prakārakatva (correspondence of a true cognition with its fact), how are we to demarcate certain species of pramā as pratyakṣaprama?

The precise answer to this question comes from the definition (D) that the property of immediacy is the unique characteristic of pratyakṣapramā (perceptual knowledge). The definition 'D' is not applicable to perceptual errors (pratyakṣabhrama) which is a species of apramā (error) and aprama (error) is characterised by the property of a cognition which does not belong to its qualific and (viśesya) (tadābhāvavati tat prakārakānubhavaḥ apramā).

Whether pratyabhijña (recognition or reminiscence) is to be considered as perceptual knowledge (pratyakṣapramā)? Even though objects are directly given in recognition and perception, there are certain differences between them. Recognition in a wider sense means understanding the nature or character of a thing. Accordingly the recognition of a thing is the knowledge of it as such and such, for example the knowledge of the animal as a cow. Generally recognition in this sense stands for determinate preception (savikalpakapratyksa) in which a thing is related to its qualities by means of predication. But in a narrow sense recognition means knowing a thing which was known before. In other words to recognise means to cognise again which was already cognised before and it is in this sense, pratyabhijñā is recognition, where there is conscious reference of the past and a present cognition to the object. Eventhough recognition is brought about by sense-impressions of previous experience of an object it cannot be memory knowledge. Because pratyabhijna is not only produced by sensimpression (memory) but also there is the necessity of perception of an object as operating cause in it. But in memory cognition there is absence of the object, recollected.

In pratyabhijñā the novelty of the knowledge consists in the identity of the thing perceived in the present with that one previously seen. The immediate cause of pratyabhjijña is the remembrance of the identity of a thing produced from previous impressions. Hence pratyabhijña is not produced by sense-impressions alone.

Recognition (pratyabhijña) brought about by sense-impressions along with previous experience of an object is to

be distinguished from perceptual knowledge characterised by immediacy (sākṣātkāritvam) and the absence of previous knowledge as its instrumental cause. If sense-object contact is a necessary condition of pratyabhijña with memory element in it then it is present in other forms of mediate knowledge like anumiti (inferential knowledge).

The definition (d) implies the absence of prior cognition to perceptual knowledge but pratyabhijña (recognition) presupposes prior apprehension as a necessary element. Hence the definition (d) is not applicable to pratyabhijña. Thus pratyabhijña (recognition) and perceptual knowledge are different types of knowledge.

Structure of perceptual knowledge : A knower (pramatra) possesses perceptual knowledge (pratyakṣa-pramā) only if pratyakṣa-pramā (perceptual instrument) functions towards perceptual object (pramaya). Perceptual knowledge is justified true cognition. The justification is said to be direct or immediate.

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- **Dr. R. I. Ingalalli,**
Karnatak Univ. Dharwad.

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Be Benevolent, Selfless and Live a Longer, Purposeful Life

In terms of physical science, when work is done energy is spent and the work manifests itself in some form of motion. When one walks a few miles or few metres or lifts a weight, the potential energy of the body is spent and work is done in form of walking the distance or lifting the weight. The work done can be measured in scientific units and the energy spent can be adjudged or assessed by the number of heart or pulse beats and the pumping stroke of the heart.

The energy thus spent by the body is replenished by means of food intake which produces the required energy by the electro-chemical process inside the body. As long as the processing plant of the body is in good shape, we can spend the physical energy, within the overall capacity of the human body, and replenish the same through food intake. For processing the food also, the body has to spend energy, which is again indicated by the number of heart beats. The problem arises only when the body ages and the processing plants show signs of wear & tear, resulting in lack of capacity to replenish the energy spent.

What happens on the plane of mental activity? Brain is the seat of all mental activity and the mind directs the brain to do the required work. Even for physical work, the mind directs the brain, which gets the work done through the nervous system & then the movement of the body parts takes place. All intellectual work, be it mathematical calculations, the logical deliberations of an advocate, searching for a diagnostic conclusion by a medical expert, deep thinking by an inventing Scientist, the thought processes of a money-spinning commercial trader or outlining

the battle field strategies by an army General, all such activities are almost pure brain work directed by the mind to find out a conclusion or a solution to a problem.

The brain activities can be divided into three broad categories. One is the pure type as in the case of the inventing scientist, the metaphysicist, the mystic or the spiritualist, in which the brain goes into deep concentration and the mind is peaceful oblivious of the surrounding world. The body co-operates with the brain in such a condition by minimising its own energy requirements, which is seen by a fall of the pulse rate and also the breathing rate, in order to maximise the energy required by the brain. Under such conditions only, our sages used to sit for years together in deep thought or Samadhi.

The second category of brain activity can be called the impure type, which is generated out of greed, jealosy, fear, worries of self-centred ego, competitive spirit for survival, race to go ahead of others at any cost etc., etc. It has been seen and indicated by increased heart beats that in such cases, the brain is overtaxed and the mind is not at peace. The brain and the heart both get overworked and the health of the body is pulled down earlier than expected.

The third category is that of benevolent activities. To work for the poor, spending a part of one's own earnings, to work for those involved in natural calamities or otherwise in distress of some sort, fall into this category. Experience indicates that work of this kind does not overtax the brain but on the contrary, it regains energy through peace of mind. Selfless devotion to work has also a similar effect. Peace of mind is essential for not allowing the brain to get overtaxed. Where from the mind gets its energy? Science has no answer. But our sages have said that the energy of the mind is limitless and that one's individual mind is part of the Universal mind "The Mahat".

What is the recipe for the existence of the common man is such a situation? The common man cannot avoid certain amount of reasonable competitive spirit, certain amount of fulfilment of ambitions for the good of himself and

his family. At the same time, if he participates in some benevolent social activities on a daily regular basis, he can regain peacefulness of mind and energy of the brain. For any individual it is essential to keep the mind and brain alert and energetic to concentrate on any piece of work or topic of study.

If everybody gets into the habit of daily regular benevolent social activity, there will be an overpowering sense of mutual belonging amongst the individuals of the society, which will generate a brotherhood, which, in turn, will make the society strong and united to stand together in prosperity as well as peril. Benevolent & selfless activity thus not only endows a longer & purposeful life on the individual but also helps to build a strong and & united nation which can fulfil the goal enjoined on our ancient society by the sages :

सर्वेऽपिसुखिनः सन्तु। सर्वे सन्तु निरामयाः।।
सर्वे भद्राणि पश्यन्तु। मा कश्चित् दुःखभाक्भवेत्।।

Let peace, happiness and health prevail in the society. Let all see good fortune and none experience grief.

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- P. D. Dharwarkar

(The article is based on views expressed by Swami Vijnananand of "Manashakti Research Centre", Bombay-Pune Road, Lonavala. The centre runs three day study courses to promote tension-free and meaningful life and has equipment for mind-level tests as well as a slogam "One hour a day for the society")

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When a philosopher talks about spiritual experience he is neither a Hindu, nor a Muslim, nor a Christian. He is a citizen of the world and for the matter of that, a citizen of the spiritual world. A philosopher is one who comes naked from the realm of God into the world and endeavours to realise the nature of Ultimate Reality for himself and to see whether this could not be spread out into society.

- Gurudeo Ranade
in Epitome of Karnatak Mysticism, P.2

Śrī Śaṅkarācārya's Ātmānātma-Viveka

(Continued from last issue)

4. शरीरपरिग्रहः केन भवति । कर्मणा ॥४॥

(Query) : What is the reason for embodiment (in case of the self)?

(Reply :-) Due to actions (4)

Action is a kind of material energy. This energy or action is generated through body, mind, and speech. Action naturally produces its own consequence/fruit/result. And that fruit has to be enjoyed by the agent of that action. Now, there are certain actions whose fruit is immediately obtained in the present life. Some actions yield their fruits after a certain period. While there are other actions which do not produce their consequences even if the present life has come to an end. Now, in order to enjoy the fruits of such actions, a man has to take a birth again. Now to be born is to be embodied. And this cycle of action →birth (= embodiment) →action goes on constantly. It should be noted that those actions which are performed with a sense of egoism and attachment lead again and again to the cycle of birth and rebirth.

5. कर्म केन भवतीति चेत्, रागादिभ्यः ॥५॥

If it be asked :- due to what reason is an action performed, (the reply is :-) (An action is performed) due to or under the influence of attachment etc. (5)

An embodied person performs actions. Those actions are incited by passions like attachment, anger, hatred, etc.

To elucidate : Whenever a man feels desire or affection or attachment to any object in this world, he undertakes an action to procure that object. So also a person can entertain hatred for that thing which is not desired or not wanted; then he undertakes an action in order to remove or destroy that unwanted thing. So also passions like wrath, envy etc. lead a man to perform certain actions. To be brief, actions are undertaken or performed under the influence of passions like attachment, anger, hatred, envy. avarice, etc.

6. रागादयः कस्माद् भवन्तीति चेत्, अभिमानात् ॥६॥

If it be asked : when do the passions like attachment and so on arise or spring?, (the reply is :) from egoism (6)

The word 'abhimāna' in the text means Egoism. To bear egoism means to think that the not-self things are really the self and to adhere to them with the sense of 'I' 'to me', and 'my'. In our usual worldly dealings we say; I am tall; I am liberal; I am snub-nosed; I want this and I do not want that; this is my wife; my parents are kind; I have got two children ; I own a farm and a house. Thus all our worldly dealings are founded on the sense of egoism. And due to this very egoism there arise passions like attachment, wrath, hatred, etc. To explain : Suppose, a man earns money for his own pleasure. Then he becomes greedy for (more) money. He becomes angry if his money is robbed by somebody or if his wife or children are harassed by somebody. He feels jealousy in case of that man who has more money than he has. In this way, passions like attachment etc. spring from the sense of egoism.

7. अभिमानोऽपि कस्माद् भवति । अविवेकात् ॥७॥

(Query:) But how (or whence) does the egoism spring?
(Reply:) (Egoism arises) from non-discrimination (7)

As observed under section 6 above, the sense of egoism is related to objects other than the self. Every thing other than the self is the non-sentient not-self. Really speaking, the real nature of 'I' is the innermost self. But as a man does not understand the difference between the self and the

not-self, he begins to think the not-self to be the self. Under Section 1 above, the distinction between the self and the not-self has been pointed out; to know this distinction means discrimination, and the absence of this discrimination is non-discrimination (aviveka). This non-discrimination alone leads to the conviction or idea that the not-self is the self. Thus, non-discrimination (aviveka) is the absence of the knowledge that the self is different from the not-self. And this non-discrimination is the cause of egoism.

8. अविवेकः कस्माद् भवति । अज्ञानात् ॥८॥

(Query :) From what does the non-discrimination arise?
(Reply) (It arises) from Nescience (8)

The Nescience (ajñāna) from which springs up the non-discrimination is not ordinary ignorance (or absence of knowledge) pertaining to worldly or secular things. Nescience is a peculiar concept in the Monistic philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya. This Nescience is sometimes called non-knowledge (or wrong knowledge) (avidyā) or sometimes is called Māyā. The concept of this Nescience is explained in the next section (9).

9. अज्ञानं केन भवतीति चेत्, न केनापि । अज्ञानं नाम अनादि सदसद्भ्यामनिर्वचनीयं त्रिगुणात्मकं ज्ञान-विरोधि भावरूपं यत् किंचिदिति वदन्ति । अहमज्ञ इत्याद्यनुभवात् । 'देवात्म शक्ति स्वगुणैर्निगूढां इत्यादि-श्रुतेः ॥९॥

If it be asked : Due to what cause does the Nescience spring?, (then the reply is:) Not from anything. The wise people say that the Nescience is beginningless, indescribable either as existent or as non-existent, made of three qualities, opposed to knowledge, of positive nature, and something strange or miraculous. (Such Nescience can be proved) on the basis of (human) experience such as "I am ignorant", and so also on the basis of the scriptural statement namely, "(the sages came to know) God's own power which had been concerned by its own qualities" (Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad I-3) (9)

In this section No. 9, the concept of Nescience is explained.

There is no cause of Nescience ; it is not produced by anything. It is beginningless, in the sense that it is not known when and where the Nescience began; hence it is said to be without beginning. Yet this Nescience is not infinite or endless; for this Nescience gets annihilated by the right knowledge of the self or Brahman. Thus this Nescience is beginningless yet subject to destruction.

The Nescience is indescribable either as existent or non-existent. It cannot be called either as existent or non-existent; hence it cannot be described by the use of the words existent or non-existent. The reason is : The existent is that which always exists in the three times the past, the present, and the future. Nescience is not such an existent, because it is destroyed by the knowledge of the self. The self alone is the existent; unlike the self, Nescience is not existent. Now, non-existent (asat) is that which is never experienced. For example, the son of a barren women, the horns of a hare, etc. The Nescience is not such a non-existent; for everybody sometime or other becomes aware that he is ignorant, that he possesses Nescience. And how can that thing which is experienced be called a non-existent? Besides, nothing can be produced from that which is non-existent. But the cosmos originates from this Nescience (see section 39) Due to this reason also Nescience is not non-existent.

Further, Nescience cannot be said to be both existent as well as non-existent; for it is contradictory to both of them; and moreover two contradictory attributes like existent and non-existent cannot be predicated of one and the same subject namely Nescience; they cannot co-exist in Nescience. Thus the Nescience is indescribable with the words existent and non-existent, as it is neither existent nor non-existent nor both.

This Nescience is of positive nature. Here Nescience is said to be of positive nature in order to indicate that it is not the absence of knowledge. Now, when Nescience is said to be of positive nature, it does not mean that Nescience is

existent like the self; for the Nescience which is of positive nature is completely annihilated by the knowledge of the self. Hence it can be said that, thing which exists or appears to exist for sometime but gets destroyed by the knowledge of the self is of positive nature.

This Nescience is made of three qualities. Sattva Rajas and Tamas are the three qualities. These three qualities are the constituent elements of Nescience; these three together form the Nescience. That the Nescience is made of three qualities is known thus : (I) Nescience is the material cause of the cosmos. Now every object in the universe possesses three properties namely pain, pleasure, and infatuation. Now the universe is the effect, product of Nescience which is its cause. The properties of the effect come or in here from its cause; hence the properties or qualities of the cause can be inferred from the properties of the effect. Thus, it can be inferred that Sattva, Rajas and Tamas which are the causes of pleasure, pain, and infatuation respectively must exist in Nescience the cause of the cosmos. (2) In a Scriptural statement namely there is one she-goat possessing the red, white and black colours (ajām ekām lohita-śukla-Kṛṣṇām - *Śvetāśvatara* Upaniṣad, 4.5), Māyā (=Avidyā, ajnāna, Nescience) is said to possess the red, white and black colours which indicate the three qualities namely Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. Thus on the basis of inference and the Scripture, Nescience is known to be formed by the three qualities.

This Nescience is 'something miraculous' It is different from the existent as well as the non-existent. Just as a eunuch is different from male and female beings, so also Nescience is distinct from the existent and the non-existent. Hence wise people call it something different, something strange, or "something miraculous"

This Nescience is contradictory to the knowledge of the self. Hence both Nescience and the knowledge of the self cannot co-exist in a person. The Nescience gets destroyed by the knowledge of the self. Nescience is completely uprooted without any residue by the knowledge of the self or Brahman.

This Nescience can be proved on the basis of our experience and Vedic Scripture (a) In this world, a man has such an experience - "I am ignorant; I possess Nescience". And that thing which is experienced must exist. (b) The Vedic Scripture asserts :-

" The sages came to know the God's own power concealed by its own qualities". Here the God's power is nothing but Māyā or Avidyā or the Nescience.

10. तस्मादज्ञानादविवेकोजायते । अविवेकादभिमानोजायते । अभिमानाद् रागादयो जायन्ते। रागादिभ्यः कर्माणि जायन्ते । कर्मभ्यः शरीरपरिग्रहो जायते । शरीर-परिग्रहाद् दुःखं जायते ॥ (१०)

From that Nescience is born non-discrimination. From non-discrimination originates egoism. From egoism spring up passions like attachment, etc. On account of passions like attachment etc. actions are performed (lit. born). Due to actions there is the embodiment. And owing to embodiment there arises pain or sorrow (10)

There was put in Section 3, a question regarding the cause of human suffering or pain. The causal series of sorrow as explained until now is as follows :

Nescience → non-discrimination → egoism → attachment, etc. Actions → embodiment → sorrow. Thus the basic or fundamental cause of human suffering is Nescience.

(11) दुःखस्य कदा निवृत्तिः । सर्वात्मना शरीर-परिग्रह-नाशे सति दुःखस्य निवृत्तिर्भवति । सर्वात्मपदं किमर्थम् । सुषुप्तवस्थायां दुःखे निवृत्तेऽपि पुनरुत्थान समये उत्पद्यमानत्वाद् वासनात्मना स्थितं भवति । अतस्तन्निवृत्त्यर्थं सर्वात्मपदम् । शरीर-परिग्रह-निवृत्तिः कदा भवति ।सर्वात्मना कर्माणि निवृत्ते सति । कर्मनिवृत्तिः कदा भवति । सर्वात्मना रागादौ निवृत्ते सति । रागादि-निवृत्तिः कदा भवति । सर्वात्मना अभिमाने निवृत्ते सति । कदा अभिमान-निवृत्तिः । सर्वात्मना अविवेके निवृत्ते सति । कदा अविवेक-निवृत्तिः । सर्वात्मना अज्ञाने निवृत्ते सति ।

कदा अज्ञान-निवृत्तिः । ब्रह्मात्मैकत्वे जाते सति अविद्या-निवृत्तिः सर्वात्मना भवति ॥११॥

(Query:-) When is there the cessation of sorrow ? (Reply:) The cessation of sorrow takes place, when there is complete destruction of acceptance of (i. e. embodiment). (Question :-) Why is the word 'complete' (Sarvātmanā) employed (here)? (Reply) :- Though in the state of sleep there is cessation of sorrow, still again at the time of the waking state (after sleep) there arises (the awareness of the embodiment and then) the sorrow; (from this it is clear that the awareness of embodiment and sorrow) survives in the form of impressions. Hence the word 'complete' is used in order to indicate that the cessation (of the awareness of embodiment and sorrow in the form of impressions) is expected here.

(Query) :- When does the cessation of embodiment take place? (Reply:-) When actions have been fully stopped i.e. destroyed.

(Question:-) When is possible the cessation (destruction) of actions? (Answer:-) On the complete cessation of (passions like) attachment etc. (Query :-) When does the cessation (of passions like attachment etc. take place ? (Reply :-) On the full cessation of egoism. (Question :-) When is there the cessation of egoism? (Answer:-) On the complete cessation of non-discrimination. (Query:-) When is there the cessation of non-discrimination? (Reply :-) On full destruction of Nescience. (Question :-) When is possible the destruction of nescience? (Answer:-) There is complete destruction of Nescience, when there has arisen (the awareness of) the oneness or identity of Brahman and the self (after the knowledge of the self) (11).

There arises sorrow on account of embodiment. Hence for the cessation of sorrow complete destruction of embodiment is essential. Embodiment means to have a body and to have an awareness of this living body in the form of 'I' 'me' and 'mine' This awareness disappears only temporarily in the state of sleep and for that much time there is cessation of sorrow. But as soon as we are awake, There again arises

the awareness of embodiment and then again we feel sorrow. The reason for this is that there is awareness of the body in the form of impressions (vāsanā), even during the sleep time. So full cessation of embodiment, complete stoppage of the cycle of birth and rebirth. Then only there is absolute cessation of sorrow.

Now the causal series of sorrow has been described in sections 3-10. An effect arises from a cause. Now no effect will follow, if its cause is destroyed. Thus, in accordance with this principle, in section 11 is described the process as to how the causes should get destroyed. Briefly the fundamental cause of sorrow is Nescience. And for its annihilation there must be the cognition of the identity between Brahman and the self (ātman) and then this oneness must become an actuality. In other words, the sorrow completely ceases, when there takes place oneness of Brahman and Atman. Nescience gets destroyed on account of realisation of the oneness of the self with Brahman which is of the nature of bliss. And on the annihilation of Nescience, the sorrow which springs from Nescience fully disappears.

(12) ननु नित्यानां कर्मणां विहितत्वात् नित्येभ्यः कर्मभ्यः अविद्यानिवृत्तिः स्यात्, किमर्थं ज्ञानेन, इत्याशंक्य न कर्मादिना अविद्या-निवृत्तिः । तत कुत इति चेत्, कर्म-ज्ञानयोर्विरोधो भवेत्।
अतो ज्ञानेनैव अज्ञान-निवृत्तिः ॥१२॥

(Objection:-) Really as daily or obligatory actions have been prescribed (by scriptures or Dharma-śāstras), there will take place the cessation of Nescience due to those very daily actions. In that case then what is the use of knowledge? (Reply:) If such an objection is raised our reply is :- There does not take place the cessation of Nescience on account of actions. etc. If it be asked : 'why is that so?', the reply is : (This would have happened if there were contradiction between actions and the Nescience) but actually there is mutual contradiction between actions and knowledge. Hence the cessation of the Nescience follows indeed from knowledge alone (12)

In this Section 12, a doubt is raised regarding the statement in Section 11 that the Nescience ceases when there is cognition of oneness between Brahman and the self, and then the doubt is removed.

The doubt or objection is :- The Vedas or the Dharmaśāstras have laid down obligatory actions like sandhyāvandana, etc. Hence they must be performed. Their performance does not procure any religious merit. but their non-performance leads to obstacles, etc. and to sorrow in future. So we can say that these obligatory actions can destroy Nescience.

This objection can be removed thus :- The obligatory actions would have destroyed Nescience, had there been an opposition between actions in general and Nescience. But the fact is that there is no mutual contradiction between actions and Nescience. Had there been mutual opposition, like that between light and darkness, between actions and Nescience, then only actions would have destroyed Nescience. But as there exits no such contradiction between actions and Nescience, the actions-be they daily / obligatory or otherwise cannot remove Nescience.

Thus Śaṅkarācārya had said in his work named Ātmabodha, 3 :- 'Action will not produce cessation of Nescience as there is no contradiction between the two'. Really speaking, there takes purification of the mind (citta) due to actions like obligatory ones, etc. Hence Sadānanda in his Vedānta-Sāra has said :- 'The highest purpose of these obligatory and other actions is the purification of the intellect or the mind.' 'The use of actions is limited only to the purification of the mind', says Śaṅkarācārya in his work Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, 11 (cittasya śuddhaye Karma)

On the contrary knowledge and Nescience, like light and darkness, are diametrically opposed to each other, and hence due to knowledge alone Nescience perishes. (See :-

Vidyā avidyāṁ nihanti eva tejaḥ timir - saṅgha-vat-Ātmabodha of Saṅkarācārya). Just as light removes /dispels the mass of darkness, so also knowledge destroys Nescience).

If all the above is taken into account, it becomes clear that action is not opposed to Nescience; on the contrary knowledge alone is contradictory to Nescience. Hence actions cannot remove Nescience, but by (Self) knowledge alone Nescience is destroyed.

Morever, here, it should be taken into account that Nescience is opposed to knowledge, that Nescience gets removed by knowledge, as was pointed out in the explanation of the concept of Nescience, under Section 3.

(13) तज्ज्ञानं कुत इति चेत्, विचारादेव भवति। आत्मानात्म-विवेक-विषय-विचाराद् भवति। तस्मिन् विचारे को वा कौ वा अधिकारी। साधन-चतुष्टय-संपन्नोऽधिकारी। साधन-चतुष्टयंनाम-(१) नित्यानित्य-वस्तु-विवेकः (२) इहामुत्रफलभोगविरागः (३) शमादि-षट्-संपत्तिः (४) मुमुक्षुत्वं चेति ॥१३॥

(Query:-) How or wherefrom is obtained the knowledge (which destroys Nescience)? If such a question is asked, the reply is :- (That knowledge) is derived or obtained from deliberation or reflection alone (That is to say :-) Knowledge is derived from that reflection or thinking whose object is the descrimination between the self and the not-self. Now, what persons are qualified or proper or fit or worthy for that deliberation? (Reply:-) A man possessing the group of four requisites (sādhana) is qualified (to undertake that reflection). And this group of the four requisites is as follows :- (1) Discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal things. (2) Aversion or indifference to or dislike or absence of craving for the enjoyment of fruits (actions) here (in this world) as well as hereafter in the next world (3) Acquisition of six things (or virtues) like peace of mind (śama) control of senses (dama) etc. (4) Possession of the desire to get released (from the cycle of birth and rebirth) (13).

A man secures Nescience-removing knowledge through reflection. Hence Vidyāraṇya, the author of Pañcadasī, has said:- Knowledge arises from reflection (vicārājjāyate Jnānam). And this deliberation refers to the objects namely the self and the not self.

Now, all persons are not capable to pursue or undertake the reflection. Only that man can reflect who has certain qualifications or worthiness. He who has got the group of four requisites becomes fit to undertake the thinking about the self and not-self. These four requisites are as follows :-

(I) There should be discrimination between the eternal and non-eternal things. Brahman/Ātma is the only eternal thing, and anything other than Ātman is non-eternal. Thus one must come to know the distinction between the eternal and non-eternal things which are the self and the not self.

(2) Aversion to enjoyment of fruits here and hereafter means absence of desire to enjoy fruits of actions in this world as well as in the next world. If one is interested in the enjoyment, he will not be able to pay sufficient attention to the eternal and non-eternal things. The knowledge that everything in this world and in the next world is temporary may lead to the absence of craving for enjoyments.

(3) The possession of six things like śama (control of mind) is very essential. For, if the mind-body complex is tossed by worldly things, it would be very difficult to concentrate the mind and to reflect on the self and the not self.

(4) Desire for liberation is the desire to secure salvation after escaping from this empirical transmigration which is full of grief. This is necessary; for, if one feels happy with this world, he will not think of escaping from it. In that case he will never undertake the reflection over the self and the not self.

These four requisites are now explained in the following sections.

(14) नित्यानित्य-वस्तु-विवेकोनाम ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्यैव इति निश्चय: ॥१४॥

The discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal things means a decision that Brahman (alone) is the true or real, while the world is only non-true or false (14)

Eternal is that thing which has no origin and no destruction, which has no limits of place, matter and time, which does not undergo any modifications or changes, and which exists in three times-the past, the present, and the future. Such eternal thing is only one and it is Brahman alone. Now this Brahman is not something different from Ātman or the Self; both are one and the same. Thus the Self is the eternal thing.

The world as opposed to Brahman/Ātman is non-eternal and hence false. The world which appears or is understood as something different from Brahman or the self is the not-self, and it is subject to origination and destruction, hence is perishable, is limited, changing and hence non-eternal and hence false.

There should be a firm decision of the intellect that Brahman or the self alone is eternal, real and true, while the world is non-eternal, unreal, untrue, and false.

The word Ātman in Ātmānātma-viveka stands for Brahman; for in the philosophy of Saṅkarācārya, Ātman is the same as Brahman.

(15) इह अस्मिँल्लोके देह-धारण-व्यतिरिक्त-विषये स्रक्-चंदन-वनितादि-संभोगे वान्ताशन-मूत्र-पुरीषादौ यथा इच्छा नास्ति तथा इच्छाराहित्यमिति इह लोक-विराग:। अमुत्र स्वर्गलोकादि ब्रह्मलोकान्तर्वर्तिषु रंभोर्वश्यादि-संभोगादि-विषयेषु तद्वत् ॥१५॥

Just as here in this world there is no desire (of anyone) for enjoying the vomitted things or urine or exeretion, etc., so also absence of craving for objects other than the

embodiment (and also) for garlands, (besmearing of) sandal (paste) and copulation with women, etc. is called aversion (virāga, regarding this world; so also absence of craving for things like enjoyments, with (nymphs like) Rambhā Urvasī etc. hereafter in words like heavenly world or in the world of Brahmā is called aversion regarding the next world (15)

The discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal things assists the obtainment of aversion or absence of craving. Vairāgya is absence of attachment or cessation of desire or craving. The attachment to the non-eternal or unreal or false things is not useful. There are many worlds like this world (=the world subject to death) i. e. next worlds such as the celestial world, etc. Fruits of actions are to be enjoyed in one of these worlds. But as all these worlds are non-eternal, the fruits of actions which can be obtained in them are also non-eternal. There should be no desire to enjoy such transitory or evanescent fruits. If there be such a desire, it is but nutural that the attention of a man will be directed towards worldly activity and worldly objects; and then such attention as is required towards the eternal thing i. e. Brahman or Ātman cannot be given. Hence the absence of desire to enjoy the fruits of actions is necessary; the possession of Vairāgya leads to easy acquisition of the six things like control of mind, etc.

(To be continued .....)

-Prof. ***Dr. K. V. Apte,*** Sangli.

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श्रीतोटकाचार्यविरचितं श्रुतिसारसमुध्दरणम् ।

PART VII

(88)

यदि तस्य कुतश्चिदिहानयनं
क्रियते तदनर्थकमेव भवेत् ।
पुरुषेण कृतस्य यतः श्रुतिता
न भवेदिति वेदविदां स्मरणम् ॥

If that (word prescribing meditation) is brought here from somewhere else, it will be meaningless only, for according to those well-versed in the Vedās, what is made by a man cannot attain the Vedic status.

Śrutis or Vedās are regarded as 'Apauruseya'. That is, they are not of human origin but of divine origin. So what is made by the hand of man will not be regarded as Veda. The Vedic text under discussion is *'Tat tvam asi'* meaning 'Thou art That', which speaks of the existing reality i.e. the absolute identity between the individual self and Brahman. If this text is to enjoin some meditation, it should contain the word 'upāsīta' instead of 'asi' as 'Tat tvam iti upāsīta meaning "Meditate upon Brahman". If this is effected, the text will lose its validity in so far as it is only the fabrication of the one who wants to twist the text into the injunction of some meditation.

(89)

किमरे! पुरुषं प्रतिबोधयितुं
स्वकमर्थमशक्तमिदं वचनम् ।
यदतोऽन्यत आनयनं क्रियते
भवता श्रवणेन विनापि विधेः ॥

Do you think this text (Thou art That) is incapable of conveying its sense (i.e. the absolute identity between the individual Self and Brahman) to a man (aspiring after spiritual knowledge), so that you are bringing the word enjoining (meditation) from some other ground, though it is not heard?

If a statement is incomplete, we have to guess some word according to the context in order to complete its sense. When the word 'door' (dvāram), for instance, is uttered, the apprehension of a word such as 'shut'(pidhehi) is necessary for the verbal comprehension to take place. However, if the sentence is complete in itself as 'Shut the door', there is no need to bring in any word from other sources. Similarly, it is totally needless to supply any word for the text 'Tat tvam asi', which is capable of conveying its sense on its own.

(90)

श्रुतहानिरिहाश्रुतकल्पितरपि
श्रुतिवित्यसमयो न भवेत्तु यतः ।
श्रुतिभक्तिमता श्रुतिवक्त्रगतं
ग्रहणीयमतो न तु बुध्दिवशात् ॥

The fallacy of the abandonment of what is heard and the imagination of what is unheard will also arise (in case of any word enjoining meditation is supplied here from some other source. However, this is not logically correct according to those versed in the Vedas. Hence the one who is faithful to Vedas must accept what emerges directly from the mouth of Vedas and not something that is imagined under the influence of his own intellect.

In the case of the Vedic texts, abandonment of what is heard (śrutahāni) and imagining what is not heard (aśruta-kalpanā) are two logical fallacies. Because, if they are allowed, one can interpret a Vedic text any way he wants. But the Vedas have a definite purport and that has to be determined by the six tests viz., introduction, conclusion, repetition of the topic at intervals, originality of the teaching, result achieved from it, eulogy and demonstration through reasoning etc.

(91)

पुरुषस्य शरीरगतात्ममतिं
मृतिसम्भवहेतुमनर्थकरीम् ।
अपनीय सदात्ममतिं दधती
महते पुरुषस्य हिताय भवेत् ॥

(The text 'Thou art That' as it is heard in the Upaniṣads) imparts the knowledge of the identity of the individual soul with Brahman by removing the notion of his identity with the body which is the root cause of the cycle of birth and death and the source of all evil, and can thus bring about a great benefit for the man.

This is a reply to the one who would argue that the text 'Thou art That' conveying the existing reality cannot fulfil any human objective, since the latter is neither acceptable nor rejectable. The above text brings a great benefit because the knowledge springing from it puts an end to all type of knowledge and thus leads to liberation ultimately.

(92)

विनिवर्तत एव शरीरगता
विपरीतमतिः पुरुषस्य तदा ।
वचनेन तु तत्त्वमसीति यदा
प्रतिबोध्यत एष त इत्यपि च ॥

When a man is awakened by the text "Thou art That" and also (by the texts as The Inner Ruler,) your own (immortal self), the false notion that the body is the self cretainly disappears.

The true nature of the Self is Brahman. Hence the notion that the body is the Self is false. This false notion *(viparīta-mati)* persists until the spiritual awakening through the Scriptures and a competent teacher. For instance, the illusory knowledge "This is silver" with regard to the shell in the shell-silver illusion continues until one realizes the true nature of the object before him, either by close observation or through some reliable person. However, on learning that the object in front is only a shell, the illusory

knowledge "This is Silver", will be, of course, sublated. In the same way, when one is awakened by the texts such as "Tat tvam asi", he realizes his true nature as Brahman and that brings an end to the false notion that the assemblage of mind, body, senses etc. is the self.

It should be remembered that the one receiving the spiritual awareness referred to here is the spiritual aspirant of a very high order, because in the case of the ordinary people the false notion does continue despite repeated hearing of the texts as "Tat tvam asi", "Aham Brahmāsmi", "Ayamātmā Brahma" etc.

(93)

यदि नापनयेच्छ्रुतिरात्ममतिं
पुरुषस्य शरीरगतामनृताम् ।
तदहंमतिहेतुककर्मगतिं
सुखदुःखफलामवशोऽनुभवेत् ॥

(If the text as "Thou art That" can not dispel the false notion of a man that the body is the self, he will have to undergo the transmigration which is caused by the self-illusion and which results in pleasure and pain.

Here Śrī Toṭaka demonstrates how without the removal of the false notion that the body is the Self the transmigratory existence cannot end. The transmigration involving the birth and death, pleasure and pain etc. is the outcome of the false identification of the self and the not-self as body etc. Hence the former is inevitable until the latter is removed.

(94)

यदि तत्त्वमसीति वदेद्वचनं
सदुपासनकर्म न तत्त्वमिति ।
पुरुषस्य फलं सदुपासनतो
विमृशामि भविष्यति कीदृगिति ॥

If the text "Thou art That" speaks of some action in the form of meditation on Brahman and not (the identity between

individual soul expressed by) 'Thou' and (Brahman indicated by) 'That', I shall now consider what type of result arises for a man from meditation on Brahman.

After having established that the text 'Tattvamasi' conveying the knowledge of the identity of the individual self with Brahman brings great benefit for the man, Śrī Toṭaka now advances to show that the above mentioned text as interpreted by the opponent cannot bring any spiritual gain.

(95)

पुरुषस्य तु मर्त्यगुणस्य भवेत्
सदुपासनया न सदात्मकता ।
न कथञ्चिदपि प्रजहाति यतः
प्रकृतिं सहजामिव कश्चिदपि ॥

The individual soul that is characterised by mortality will not attain identity with Braahman through meditation on the latter. Because, in this world, on no account can anybody abandon his natural form.

Mortality *(martyaguṇa)* here refers to the cycle of birth and death an embodied soul undergoes, as it were. Brahman, however, is not subject to mortality and hence different from the embodied soul. This difference, according to the opponent is quite natural. But in that case, says Toṭaka, no meditation can make the individual soul non-different from Brahman. Indeed, no efforts can bring about the non-difference between pot and cloth. And if the individual soul remains in its original form without any spiritual progress even after meditation, the latter is of no use.

(96)

यदि देहभृदेष सदात्मकतां
प्रगमिष्यति वै सदुपासनया ।
न जिहासति रूपमसौ हि निजं
यत ऐक्यगतिर्न भवत्युभयोः ॥

Even if it is accepted that an individual soul attains identity with Brahman through the meditation on It, that state of identity between the two will never arise because the individual soul would not like to give up its own nature.

Only to please the opponent it may be granted that meditation on Brahman leads to the identity of the individual self with the latter. But on the opponent's view the identity between the two is never attainable because, as stated earlier, acording to him, the individual self is essentially different from Brahman and under no circumstances it would like to abandon its natural form. Suppose the individual self attains identity with Brahman, it would lose its own existence and that is totally absurd. However, this absurdity will not arise in the Vedānta theory because, according to it, the individual self in its true form is Brahman itself and the so-called difference between the two is only apparent and that will be removed on the dawn of the right knowledge from the texts such as 'Tattvamasi'

(97)

रसविध्दमयः प्रकृतिं सहजां
प्रविहाय यथा कनकत्वमियात् ।
पुरूषोऽपि तथा सदुपासनया
प्रतिपत्स्यत एव सदात्मकताम् ॥

(Opponent:) Just as the iron added to the philosopher's stone turns into gold abandoning its original nature, the individual self also attains oneness with Brahman by the meditation on Brahman.

(98)

अयसोऽवयवानभिभूय रसः
स्थितवाननलानुगृहीतिमनु ।
कनकत्वमतिं जनयत्ययसि
प्रतिपन्नमयो न तु काञ्चनताम् ॥

(Vedāntin :) Following the melting of the iron, the elixir mixed with the former spreads its components and remaining therein it creates the impression of gold in iron. The iron, however, has not really changed into gold.

Rasa here is elixir or the philosopher's stone, which is an imaginary substance with which, it was formerly believed, the alchemist would change any metal into gold.

The impression of gold in iron as that of silver in shell is illusory, because one thing cannot really change into another. If this is analogous with the type of oneness an individual self attains with Brahman through meditation, argues Toṭaka, the liberation also becomes illusory. And what a ridiculous theory ! Nobody would strive for attaining such liberation.

In the next two slokas Śrī Toṭaka demonstrates how the impression of gold in iron is only artificial and hence non-eternal.

(99)

उदकावयवानभिभूय पयो
रजतावयवाँश्च यथा कनकम् ।
विपरीतमतिं जनयत्युदके
रजते च तथायसि हेममतिम् ॥

Just as the milk spreading over the components of water gives rise to the false notion "This is milk" with regard to water or just as the gold spreading over the components of silver makes us feel "This is gold" with regard to the silver, the elixir creates the impression of gold in the iron.

(100)

रसवीर्यविपाकविनाशमनु
प्रविनश्यति काञ्चनताप्ययसः ।
कृतकं हि न नित्यमिति प्रगतं
समवेतमवश्यमपैति यतः ॥

With the removal of the efficacy of the elixir, the state of being gold of the iron will vanish Because it is well-known that what is done artificially is not eternal and what comes from outside will, of course, perish.

(101)

अमृतत्वमसत्पुरुषाय यदि
क्रियते सदुपासनया यजिवत् ।
यजिकार्यवदन्तवदेव भवे
त्कृतकस्य यतो विदिताऽध्रुवता ॥

If the liberation is not existent at present for the individual soul and is attainable by meditation on Brahman as the heaven etc. by sacrifice, then it is surely impermanent like the result of the sacrifice, becausse the non-eternality in case of what is artifical is quite well-known.

Amṛtatva (immortality) is liberation, which is the state of absolute identity of the individual self with Brahman. This, according to the opponent, is totally absent in the state of bondage and can be attained through meditation as the heaven etc. through sacrifice *(yaji)*. Śrī Toṭaka refutes this view by stating that the so-called liberation, which is attainable through some action as meditation is indeed perishable as the heaven that is the result of action in the form of sacrifice. And it is needless to speak of non-eternality of results as heaven etc. which come to an end when all the stock of merit *(puṇya)* responsible for it is over.

(102)

पुरुषस्य सतश्च विधर्मकयोः
सदुपासनया न भवेत्समितिः ।
यदि संगतिरिष्यत एव तयो -
रवियुक्ततया न चिरं वसतः ॥

The union of the individual soul and Brahman which are contrary to each other in nature is not possible. Even if

the union of the two is sought for, they will not remain united for a long time.

In the opponent's view the individual soul and Brahman are contrary to each other in nature *(vidharmaka)*, because the former is subject to transmigration while the latter is beyond all transmigratory existence and hence they are totally different from each other. The union, therefore, between them is impossible. Even if that is forced, it will be only short-lived like the union between the two hands. This union itself is considered *Mokṣa* (liberation) by the opponent. But those who believe in *Mokṣa* accept it to be everlasting.

(103)

फलमीदृगिदं सदुपासनतः
पुरुषस्य भविष्यति नान्यदतः ।
न च तन्निरवद्यतयाऽभिमतं
विदुषां बहुदोषसमीक्षणतः ॥

This type of result emerges from the meditation on Brahman for the individual soul and nothing else. And that (view) is not accepted as unobjectionable by the wise, because it involves many a shortcoming.

The shortcomings pointed out in the opponent's view will not arise in the Vedanta theory because according to it, the liberation is not something that is attainable altogether newly since the idividual soul, as stated already, is absolutely non-differenct from Brahman. The so-called difference between the two is only apparent being caused by ignorance *(ajñāna)*. With the removal of ignorance on the dawn of right-knowledge from the texts as "tattvamasi" the individual soul enjoys its absolute identity with Brahman. Thus, according to Vedānta, liberation is the attainment of what is already attained.

(To be continued .....)

- **Dr. Mahesh Hampiholi**

❑❑

ETERNITY COMPRESSED IN TIME
MY REMINISCENCES OF SHRI GURUDEVA

(Continued)

I have already mentioned that my wife, daughters and sons are all Nāmadharakas and active devotees of Shri Gurudeva. Their faith and devotion have been amply rewarded. Shri Gurudeva has protected them from dangers, guided them through difficulties, opened for them new vistas of academic and spiritual progress, and worked miracles in their lives. My eldest son Dr. Rajendra suffered form severe diarrhoea at the age of two in 1955-56 which reduced him to a mere skelton despite all treatment. There being little hope of his survival, I wrote a letter to Shri Gurudeva conveying to him my forebodings. On his direction I got the child examined by Dr. Chatterji, the Principal Medical Officer and renowned physician of Jodhpur. I took him to the residence of Dr. Chatterji where patients made a beeline every morning. Surprisingly the doctor called me in on a priority basis. he examined the child throughly and prescribed the most potent drug of the time called Sulfamycitine (syrup) along with some light skimmed milk preparation and vibrose for diet. When on inquiry by him I told him that I was working as Lecturer in Philosophy at Jaswant College, he did not charge any consulation fee. Dr. Chatterji was a veritable Dhanwantari of his time, and my son recovered under his treatment miraculously by Shri Gurudeva's grace.

I am happy to recall that Rajendra's life was again miraculoulsly saved in the year 1967 when he was undergoing treatment for diptheria at M. G. Hospital Jodhpur. The doctor prescribed penicillin injection which was supposed to be the specific medicine for that malady. The doctors at the hospital retired for lunch at 1 p.m. and would be available only at 4 p.m. The nurse on duty sterilised the syringe for the pencillin prick, but I informed her that Rajendra was allergic to penicillin. But the nurse retorted, "How do you know? Well, I will first test the effect of the drug by injecting a small amount of the same." She injected the drug and finding no erruption on the skin went on to inject the full dose. But to

our dismay there was immediate reaction. Rajendra cried with pain and within seconds his nails and fingers began to turn bluish. I began to pray to Shri Gurudeva for instant grace. Fortunately, my younger brother Dr. Pukh Raj who had served for a few years in the same hospital as Assistant Civil Surgeon before joining the Army Medical Core on Short Service Commission had come on leave from Pathankot, and was present with us on that occasion. The medical staff of the hospital knew him very well, and he too on his part was well acquainted with the ward and the nursing staff. He ordered the compounders to search out the Coramine injection from the medicine chest lying in the ward. One injection was available by Shri Gurudeva's grace. Every second was important because entire body of Rajendra was fast turning blue. My brother instantly gave the Coramine injection. That life-saving drug had its immediate effect, and to our great relief Rajendra emerged from the coma and soon the allergic symptoms vanished. Much of reflection is not needed to discover the concatenation of the circumstances that ultimately resulted in the miraculous escape of Rajendra from certain death. The calamity was destined to occur. But as asserted by Shri Bhausahib Maharaj, Guru's grace can wipe out even the lines of Destiny which are supposed to be irresistibly indelible. The serving of injection by the nurse at about 2 p.m. when the doctors were off-duty, the presence of my brother on the occasion, the instant allergic reaction of the Penicillin on Rajendra leaving hardly any time to call doctors or to fetch the life-saving Coramine injection from some chemist shop, my brother's spontaneous instruction to the nursing staff to search out the injection from the ward medicine chest, the unquestioned obedience of the compounders to carry out my brother's command because the latter had worked in the same hospital as civil surgeon for a number of years, the availability of Coramine injection in the ward medicine chest - all these circumstances and their arrangement which accomplished the miracle occured due to divine grace.

To continue the story of the acts of grace of Shri Gurudeva I can hardly resist the temptation of narrating

one more outstanding event in Rajendra's life. Rajendra grew into a fine young scientist who earned doctorate in Inorganic Chemistry from the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, worked as a Research Associate at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, and was appointed as a Chemist in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission. His first posting was at the drilling ship Sagar Samrat located at Bombay High. It is now a matter of history that the Sagar Samrat was completely destroyed by an uncontrollable terrible fire in the year 1983. Dr. Rajendra was on duty on the ill-fated drilling ship when the tragedy occured. He had finished his daylong duty. However, on a request from one of his colleagues he again went down in the ship to officiate for him for a couple of hours. After some time suddenly there fell a strange silence in the busy ship. Rajendra tried to contact the colleagues manning the drilling operations up in the ship. But failing to get any response, he hurriedly came upstairs and found that almost the whole staff of seventy workers and officers had collected on the deck because the ship had caught fire. Danger sirens shrieked. It was decided to vacate the ship. Life-boats were released in the dark waters of the sea. They were rocking to and fro in the monsoon hit ocean making it very difficult for the staff to embark on them. But the task was accomplished without any loss of life. There was no question of salvaging the bag and baggage which had to be left behind in the burning ship. As every batch of workers had to spend a fortnight on the ship they had to carry with them minimum of personal belongings. Rajendra also kept with him an attache containing some clothes and books like 'Manobodh' and 'Pathway to God in Hindi Literature' for daily spritual reading. But every one had to leave behind all his belongings in that emergency shifting to the life-boats.

After a few anxious hours spent on the wave-rocked life-boats, some ship was sighted by them. An s.os. was flashed to the ship. All the workers were rescued by the staff on the ship and were brought safely to the shore. Rajendra wrote to us about the nightmarish experience undergone by him, and the protection given by Shri Gurudeva in answer to his

fervent prayers. The Sagar Samrat perished completely in the flames though every effort was made to salvage it by requisitioning the services of foreign firefighting experts.

It would not be out of place to mention a rare miracle connected with Dr. Rajendra's service tenure at the Bombay High. In those days he was doing up and down between New Delhi and Bombay every fortnight. Once while boarding the Delhi-bound train at Bombay Central, the folder containing the photos of the Samadhi of Shri Nimbargi Maharaj, Shri Bhausahib Maharaj, Shri Amburao Maharaj and Shri Gurudeva suddenly dropped away from the shirt pocket. The train came in motion, and Rajendra could not do anything but to repent over the loss of the cherished possession. The miracle of all miracles happened when on his return trip to Bombay he spotted out the folder lying in a corner down the plat form near the railway track. Even after a fortnight of loss, the recovery of the valued folder at Bombay Central station came as a pleasant surprise and boundless joy to Dr. Rajendra who mentally bowed down at the holy Feet of Shri Gurudeva in thanksgiving.

(To be continued .....)

Prof. **M. L. Sharma,**
Jodhpur.

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Punya Tithi Saptah June 1996.

The Punya Tithi Saptah of Sri. Gurudeo Dr. R. D. Ranade, will be celebrated as usual, in the Gurudeo Mandir, Hindwadi, Belgaum from 02-06-1996 to 06-06-1996. The Devotees are requested kindly to take advantage of the Saptah and join intensive meditation and discourses. The Sadhakas coming from out-side places, who need accomodation in the Gurudeo Mandir premises are requested to give advance intimation to the Secretary of the academy, before 25-05-1996 to enable to make necessary arrangements for their comfortable stay here, during the Saptah period.

(J. M. Kulkarni)
Secretary.

31-03-1996.

Book Reviews

The Philosophical Traditions of India

- by P. T. Raju, Published by : Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 1992, PP.1-256, Rs. 175/-

The main aim of the book is to provide a plausible explanation for the fundamental concepts of Indian Philosophy. The author of the book claims to have considerable amount of teaching experience of Indian Philosophy to Indian and Western students; and he tries to provide historical development of Indian thought within a limited space. The book consists of fifteen chapters including introduction. According to the author the book is an elementary text meant for the beginners. Normally a standard elementary text in Indian philosophy ought to provide an authentic information about the systems based on the original texts of the classics. The main object of this review is to assess the subject matter of the work (book) as a text.

First chapter entitled nature and development of Indian thought contains literal or etymological explanation of certain basic, concepts like 'darśana', 'mata', 'dharma', 'yoga' etc.

Eventhough the word 'darśana' literally means 'seeing or viewing' it signifies a system of thought. However, 'mata' designates an opinion or dogma in case of religious affairs. The term 'yoga' stands for spiritual discipline; however, yoga is also a system of philosophy. As a matter of historical fact Indian religious tradition can be traced back to the pre-Aryan Harappa and Mohanjo-daro civilization. However, the author has not referred to - Harappa civilization (28, 33), which is an important source of religion.

The second chapter on the Vedas and other sources is about the formation of the castes and divisions of life-career, and non-vedic religious influences including the epics. The Vedas as sacred books consists of higher wisdom and lower or worldly knowledge. According to the author there are various attempts at reconciliation between the theories of active life and that of contemplative life as advocated in Karma Kāṇda and Upāsana-Kānda respectively. In order to facilitate the studies of Veda certain accessories are prescribed; they are: (1) Śiksa (Phonetics) which helps exact

pronounciation and intonation; (2) Kalpa (ceremonial cannons) as a guide to perform sacrificial acts, (3) Vyākarana (grammar) provides the criteria or rules for the correct construction of sentences including declinations and conjugations, (4) Nirukta (lexican); it provides the meanings of obscure words (5) Chandassu (prosody) provides information regarding the structure of meters of poetic language, and (6) Jyotisa (astronomy) is the source of information concerning the time of the different constellations appearing in the sky in order to fix the time of sacrifice. There are also four upāngas (secondary treatises) namely (1) Nyaya (logic), (2) Mimamsa (theory of textual interpretation) (3) Dharma-śāstras (Ethical treatises) and (4) Purānas (epics). Perhaps it is an inaccurate view of the author (43) that here Nyāya and Mimasā are not the usual schools of philosophy, because it is an established practice to treat Nyāya, Mimāmsā, even Vyākarana as Vedic schools of thought.

There are also non-vedic religious sources which are called āgama and tantras. Saivāgamas and Śāktāgamas are considered to be important sources of religious and philosophical ideas. However, there is a mutual influence of vedic and agamic traditions in the evolution of Indian thought.

Next the central ideas of the Upaniṣads is the subject matter for third chapter. The Upanisads contain the teaching of seers (ṛsis) who realized the ultimate reality as Atman or Brahman. Another important idea is that of ṛta as cosmic moral law which implies rightness correctness or truth.

In the fourth chapter on Pūrva-mīmamsā shcool is introduced as the activist tradition. This system is about dharma (duty), which implies injunctions for right actions. Mīmāṃsakas are both realists and pluralists. According to Kumarila, categories of the world are divided into positive and negative. The class of positive category consists of substance including potency (Sakti) and similarity, quality including numbeł action and universal. The class of negative categories includes prior negation, posterior negation, absolute negation and mutual negation. According to

Prabhākaras there are only positive categories but not negative. Kumaril's classification resembles in many respects the Naiyāikas scheme of categories. However, Kumarila accepts six sources of knowledge namely perception, inference, comparision, verbal testimony, postulation and non-cognition. Since Prabhākara does not admit the category of absence, he does not consider non-apprehension as an independent pramāna. Mīmāmsakas give more importance for activity; consequently there is an emphasis on active life with definite purpose for the attainment of highest good.

The heterodox systems are considered in the chapters 5, 6 and 7 which consist of Materialistic tradition, Jainism and Buddhism respectively. Carvakas are radical empiricists as they accept only direct perception as means of apprehending the objects in the world; accordingly whatever is perceptible is real and real is perceptible. Author's remark is that Carvaka is a supporter of the value, wealth (artha), however, it is usually said that they are the followers of hedonism which implies immediate pleasure in daily activities. In contradistinctions with materialists, Jainas advocate the ethics of self-control and renunciation as means for higher values. They advocate pluralistic realism and accordingly believe in the independent existence of material world. Jainas accept the sources of immediate and mediate knowledge. Their theory of inference consists of tark or modal reasoning and syllogistic inference. The author thinks that tarka in Jainism is not the same as that of the Naiyayikas. For Naiyayikas tark is a form of counter-factual reasoning, however, Jainas treat it as the basis of all counter-factual conditionals (Jaina-tarkabhāsa of Yasovijaya). Accordingly Nayavāda also implies modal assertions (99). Jaina theory of non-violence has its practical implication for strict custom of the vegetarianism including non-jainas influenced by that theory.

The system of Bauddhas consists of the doctrines of Karma, of momentariness, of the non-atman, of causation, and of relative existence. The doctrine of Karma seems to be incompatible with the theory of nairatmya vāda, because the self is necessary agent responsible for actions.

The logical tradition of the Nyāya constitutes seventh chapter; the founder of the system Gautam formulated Nyāya-sūtra or basic text of the system. Realism of Nyaya implies that the world is the totality of knowable objects including knowledge, the means of knowledge and the knower which are distinct and real. Tark as subjunctive reasoning is an aid to pramāna. Tarka as subjunctive reasoning implies counter-factual reasoning in the course of establishment of inferential truth; hence it is not invalid form of reasoning. Eventhough Indian inductive methods are not similar to western methods it has its own theoretical advantages in the formulation of law like statements.

Next an allied system for Nyaya namely the pluralistic tradition of the Vaiśesika is given in the ninth chapter. The meta-physics of Vaiśesika consists of the categories, dravya (substance), guna (quality), karma (activity), Sāmānya (universal). Visesa (particular) Samavāya (inherence) and absence (abhāva); the right understanding of the categories leads to the goal of human life i. e. liberation. The system is also known for its unique atomic theory for explaining the structure of the universe.

In the tenth chapter this is a treatment of the dualistic tradition of the Sānkhya, its metaphysics or ontology consists of puruśa (ātman) prakrti (nature), Mahat (reason), Ahmakara (ego), Manas (mind), five Jñānendriyaya (sensory organs), five Karmendriyas (motor organs), five tanmatras (subtle elements) and five mahabhutas (gross elements) of the universe. Theory of evolution is an important part of the system by means of which the changes in the world are explained.

Next the yoga tradition of Patañjali is the subject matter of eleventh chapter. The essence of yoga consists in unique theory of consciousness (citta), and systematic regulation of the functions of Citta leads to freedom. There are eight steps to realize the goal: yama, niyama, āsana, prānayāma, pratyāhara, dhārana, dhyana and samadhi. In the state of Samadhi an individual self realises his own identity with divinity.

The Vedānta and the Monistic traditions of the spirit are the subject matters for chapter twelve, in which brief accounts of Saṃkara's advaita, Ramanuja's viśiṣṭādvaita Madhva's dvaita and Nimbarkas bhedābheda are given. Eventhough pre-śamkara advaitins like Gaudapāda were influenced by idealistic views of Buddhism, Samkara tried to re-formulate the main ideas of advaita. In this system ultimate reality is pure consciousness. However, the world is empirically real. Ramanuja's system is influenced by Pāñcarātra āgamās. In this system there is a harmonious blending of knowledge and devotion. Knowledge of reality is expressed in the form of 'Si P' when S the subject and P as predicate of a judgement.

The Epics and the ethical codes are considered in the chapter XIII. The ethical codes are usually called as dharmasastras or the science of right action. There are four sources of knowing the ethical codes. The veda, the smrtis, examples of good men and intuition regarding what is good to oneself.

Lastly, the chapter XIV: The traditions' and contemporary trends consists of brief accounts of modern Indian thinkers who are influenced by the teachings of Swami Vivekananda, Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy of action, Shri B. G. Tilak's yoga of action, Shri R. N. Tagore's devotional monism, Integral yoga of Shri Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan's orientation of traditional advaita and radical monism of J. Krishnamurti are the progressive developments of Indian philosophical thoughts for enriching the human values.

The author has given a separate list of references for further reading. In order to qualify the book as a fairly good text there is need to incorporate standard arguments and criticisms from the main sources so that students are exposed to original ideas. However, the book is useful for the beginners and other persons to get preliminary information about the Indian systems.

- **Dr. R. I. Ingalalli.**

❑

'Hindu Spirituality' :

Ed. by ***Krishna Sivaraman*** *: (First Indian edition) Pub. : Motilal Banarasidas - 1995 : Pages : Demy 1/8 : XLIII + 447 : Price - Rs. 190/-*

This volume seems to be the sixth in an all comprehensive series, entitled "WORLD SPIRITUALITY". From the first page to the last, it is well-planned and well executed. In the beginning the editor has given an exhaustive introduction in the form of curtain-raiser to the Hindu Spirituality. Though the word "Hindu" in the title sounds strange as it is of recent origin, it distinguishes spirituality in India from the rest. The volume is divided into eight parts and nineteen essays - all of them by eminent authors. The editor, himself, gives the summary of all the essays in the introduction (P.XXXI-XL) and that itself is the review of the book as well. a useful glossary and indices are helpful to the readers.

The first part covers the Vedic literature from Vedas to Upanisads. Rajendra P. Pandeya, in the first essay (Ch.1) refers to spiritual outpourings of the Vedic seers and points out that sacrifice is a means of the 'gross giving way to the subtle' (P.8) 'the one as many' and the mystical energy of Indra as 'māyā' (P.20). In the second essay (Ch.2), Hriday. R. Sharma deals with the spirituality in Vedic sacrifice and remarks that it culminates in 'Reality of the one supreme being'. He refers to 'prānayoga' which in later periods is known as 'Kundalinī-yoga' (P-32). The third essay (Ch. 3) by Wayne Whillier, covers the Vedic tradition. He has coined a happy word 'Vedism' as against 'Hinduism' of later times, and avers that this transition took place before the Christian era when caste ideology triumphed and intuitive insight got the upper hand over ritual performance. John. G. Arapura (Ch. 4) surveys the Upanisads and concludes Brahman/Atman as the ultimate Reality. In the end, he upholds Shankara's interpretation of 'Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma, tajjalān, iti 'shānta upāsīta'.

The second part contains three essays. In the first (Ch.5), Kenneth. H. Post refers to the spiritual foundation of caste and remarks that 'caste is the manifestation of beginningless justice' (P:101). K. R. Sundararajan, in the second essay (Ch. 6) surveys Rāmāyana and observes 'dharma' as cosmic harmony and 'adharma' as cosmic imbalance. Arun

Kumar Mookarjee (Ch.7) deals with Mahābhārata and declares 'Dharma' as its Supreme teaching and rightly concludes that it surpasses both ethics and morality and is a bridge between heaven and earth while 'moksha' is beyond both (P. 146).

Sagar Mal Jain, a devoted Jain, in part three (Ch.8) gives the gist of that religion as 'Karma is bondage', 'abstension removes Karmic impurity' 'Soul itself is God' (P. 166) and 'Divine grace has no place in liberation'. He points out that non-violence and individual effort are the pivot of the Jain faith and due to the theory of 'Syādvāda' Jainism respects all faiths.

Part four contains three essays. Ravi Ravindra, in the first essay (Ch.9), surveys Pātanjala Yoga, which declares 'Kaivalya' as aloneness in which 'the seer, seen and the seeing are all one' (p.186). He avers that Yoga is the discipline of the mind and elimination of the ego. In the second essay, Aravinda Sharma (Ch.10) analyses the concept of Buddhi in Geeta. It is both cosmic and psychic and its purification leads to emancipation. Harold. G. Coward (Ch.11) deals with spirituality in Indian Grammarian tradition. He discusses the 'sphota-vāda' of Bhartrhari and remarks that 'words are spiritualised sound' (P.209) and mantraś have spiritual value. He declares, 'Here again the Indian approach shows itself to be more encompassing and insightful than the bifurcated and too narrow view of the modern West ' (P.214).

Kālidāsa Bhattāchārya's paper, 'Vedanta as Reflective spirituality' (Ch.12) deserves to be chewed and digested. It exhibits the profundity of the author's knowledge of the subject. 'Vedanta understands by Self, pure consciousness' in his theme. In view of the importance of the topic, the editor has felt the necessity of an abstract before the paper.

Part six contains three papers on Vishistādvaita (Ch.13) Shivādvaita (Ch. 14) and Dvaita (Ch.15) by S. S. Raghavachar Krishna Shivarama and K. T. Pandurangi respectively. All these are authentic and informative as they come from the pen of experts on the subjects. All these schools are theistic and as such dèvotion to the Lord is the only means of liberation. Rāmānuja and Madhva attack Shankara's Māyāvāda', but they have not refuted his arguments in 'adhyāsa-bhāṣya. Moreover, they have overlooked

those Upanisadic passages which denounce dualism such as neha nanasti kinchana', 'Yatra dwaitamiva bhavati' etc.

Klaus. K. Klostermaier, in his essay 'Spirituality and Nature (Ch. 16) refers to the sānkhya view that prakriti' (Nature) itself aids the spiritual awakening in 'Purusha'. His remark 'A doubt may be raised, however, whether Sānkhya is as unqualified dualistic as Adwaita contends and whether advaita is really unqualifiedly monistic' (P.328), is worth considering. In the end, he quotes some of the eminent modern physicists like David Bohn, Weizsacker etc. who see spirituality through physics. S. N. Bhavasar and Gertud Kiem in their essay (Ch. 17) 'spirituality and health', assert that 'āyurveda' has spiritual foundation. He quotes Charaka profusely, who says that disease is 'prajnāparādha' (offence against prajna)" (P.350)

All this is theory. Are there any pious souls in modern times who represent the Hindu spiritual tradition? Yes, there are. So the editor provides the examples of Ramana Maharshi, Shri Chandrashekharendra Saraswati (Ch.18) and Ānandamayī Mā (Ch.19). The first two are men while the last is a lady, : the Swamiji of Kamakoti Peetham has gained spiritual eminence from scriptural study while in case of remaining two the journey was from experience to scripures. Thirdly, Ramana was a sanyasin without initiation, the pontiff of the Math was a regular Sanyāsin and the third was a devoted house-wife. But all the three represent Advaita philosophy. The sage of Arunachalam affirms, "Ego, the product of Avidyā, creates man, God and the world" and "The world is unreal as the world, but real as the self" (P. 374). The Shankaracharya of Kanchi avers that 'Religion is the way to inward peace' (P. 382) and 'Devotion is the link between the deity and the devotee'. Lastly the enlightened lady, who is neither a spiritual teacher nor a mystic declares, 'There can be nothing which can be other than god' and 'who are you ? You are yourself God'. (P. 406).

On the whole this precious volume deserves to be read and re-read. It is, as it were, a host of eminent scholars speaking to you directly on the various aspects of Hindu spirituality. And therefore, this volume should decorate the shelves of every home-library.

Dr. C. N. Deshpande.

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The Academy of Comparative Philosophy & Religion, Belgaum.

QUARTERLY REPORT

For the period ending 31-03-1996.

The Chinmaya Mission Centre Belgaum had arranged spiritual discourse on 'Hanuman Chalisa', by Swami Swabodh Chaitanya of Chinmaya Mission Madras, in the Gurudeo Mandir, in English, during the period from 16-01-1996 to 19-01-1996 daily from 06-30 p.m. to 08-00 p.m. the function was well attended and the audience enjoyed the same.

The ladies of the Ranade Colony Hindwadi Belgaum, had arranged a small function in the Gurudeo Mandir, on 21-01-1996 which ended with Bhajan and Arati.

Sri Suprakash Chaitanya Swamiji of Hubli camped in the Gurudeo Mandir during the period from 22-01-1996 to 28-01-1996 and again from 26-02-1996 to 03-03-1996, conducted classes on Srimad Bhagawad-Geetha on all the days from 05-00 p.m. to 07-00 p.m. Many persons attended and took advantages of the classes.

The members of the Jyeshtha Nagarik Sangh Belgaum had arranged Makar Sankrant function in the Gurudeo Mandir on 28-01-1996 and the same ended with arati, followed by meditation and distribution of prasad.

The members of Swaroop Upasana Kendra Belgaum had arranged discourses on meditation and Jnaneswari (8th Chapter) by the eminent scholar Dr. Madhavarao Nagarkar of Pune, on 20-02-1996 and 21-02-1996. The function was well attended and the audience very well appreciated the function.

Parama Poojya Swami Dayanand Saraswati of Rishikesh who had come for the inauguration of the function of Geetha classes by Sri Suprakash Swamiji of Hubli, visited the Gurudeo Mandir on 23-02-1996 at 08-30 p.m. and garlanded the padukas of Sri Gurudeo R. D. Ranade and highly appreciated the functioning of the academy.

Parama Poojya Sri Ganapatrao Maharaj, Adhyatma Bhandar Shanti Kuteer Konnur Bijapur Dist. an eminent scholar and ardent disciple of Sri Gurudeo Sampradaya gave a talk on Dasabodh. The function was well attended.

The members of Radhasoami Satsang Beas Belgaum Centre had arranged Satsang function in the Gurudeo Mandir on 24-03-1996. Sri. Dalapat Hasijya of Kolhapur delivered lectures on Sant Idea/Sant Mata in the evening from 04-00 p.m. to 06-00 p.m. the devotee attended the function in a very big number and the same ended with arati and distribution of prasad.

We are thankful to the following persons for donations given to the academy.

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(J. M. Kulkarni)
Secretary.

31-03-1996. ❑❑

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